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What is the underlying structure of the climate, conflict and socio-economic system in Uganda? 
A network analysis 
1. Objective and research question 
The main objective of this analysis is to quantify the underlying structure of the climate, socioeconomic 
and conflict system. Understanding how the three main themes (climate, conflict and socioeconomic) 
are connected, is key to defining intervention and mitigating conflict. The main research question we 
aim to address is: What is the underlying structure of the climate, conflict, and socio-economic system 
in Uganda? 
2. Methods and data 
Using network analysis, a statistical model is built to quantitatively display the connections between 
several variables pertaining to climate variabilities, security threats and socioeconomic risks, in order 
to identify the underlying structure of this complex system of relationships. 
Climate variables were compiled using Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data 
(CHIRPS) data [17]. Conflict data were gathered from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
Project (ACLED). Socio-economic data were collated from the Living Standard Measurement Surveys 
(LSMS).  
3. Results 
What is the underlying structure of the climate, conflict and socio-economic system? 
Uganda is a landlocked country that is highly vulnerable to climate disruptions. Temperatures in 
Uganda have continued to rise while seasonal precipitation has decreased and rainfall variability has 
increased [1,2]. The country also suffers from variable drought and flood events [1,2]. Seeing as 
agriculture employs a large portion of the Ugandan workforce, the climate crisis is likely to heavily 
impact the economy [3,4,5]. Since achieving its independence in 1962, Uganda has experienced decades 
of civil war, armed insurgencies, ethnic conflicts, and violent transitions of power [6,7]. Despite the end 
of the war in 2006 the country still faces many socio-economic vulnerabilities, especially through weak 
governance of natural resources. These socio-economic and political vulnerabilities and risks are likely 
to be exacerbated by the climate crisis aggravating instability and insecurity in the country. 
Among 30 variables, the network model retained 17 variables. Each category of variable is represented 
in the network model (different colours), suggesting the relevance of many sectors of the socioeconomic 
landscape to the climate-conflict nexus, for Uganda (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between climate, conflict and socio-economic risks as a network model for the 
Uganda case. The width of each edge corresponds to the strength of the relationship between each pair 
of variables. 
At first assessment of the network, all climate variables are closely linked (node 14,15,16,17). In the 
same way this is also the case with the employment and education variables (node 1,2,3) as well as 
the conflict variables (node 10,11,12,13). Evidently, these variables within each category show strong 
relationships among themselves. There are also strong links to other categories indicating the 
interdependence between them. For example, climate (node 16) is linked to total household income 
(node 4). In Uganda, agriculture is a significant contributor to the economic sector, employing 72% of 
the workforce and representing 50% of the total exports [5,8].  The Ugandan agricultural sector is 
particularly vulnerable considering that it is mainly composed of small-scale subsistence farmers that 
do not have sufficient adaptive capacity to respond to climate shifts [9]. Climate change impacts 
agricultural production directly through lowering of water resources, increasing weather volatility, 
and changing the distribution and incidence of pests thus reducing crop production and productivity 
[5,8]. The climate challenges faced by farmers are likely to have severe consequences therefore on 
household income of Ugandan citizens that rely so heavily on agricultural outputs. 
As climate drives this nexus of poverty risks (e.g., node 15, 16 to node 4; node 16 to node 8, 9) so 
too these poverty risks drive conflict (e.g., node 9 to 11, 12, 13). Indeed, climate variability and 
extremes have the potential to exacerbate existing risks and vulnerabilities in a system. In Kasese, the 
variability of climate and extreme weather events are negatively impacting land, water and food 
systems and therefore having an overall adverse effect on the economy. Coffee is a popular crop in 
Kasese and generates 80% of the agricultural income in the area, with large climate extremes, coffee 
production faces immediate risks to production which impacts food security (and thus drives poverty) 
[10]. Conflicts over land use and access in Kasese have been extensively reported while tensions 
between communities also exist over the access to water resources [11,12,13]. The network illustrates 
how climate extremes (node 16), drive/impact crop production (node 9) and in turn can result in 
multiple pathways of conflict outbreaks (node 10, 11, 12, 13).  
Employment and education also show its ties to conflict outbreaks in Uganda. Illiteracy, which 
tends to hinder health, participation in the labour market and poverty reduction, is considerable in 
Kasese with 32.1% of the total population aged 18 and above who are illiterate, while female 
percentages sit even higher [14]. If we look at our network structure, we can see direct ties between 
literacy level (node 1) and conflict outbreaks (node 12). In low- and middle-income African countries, 
education emerged as a development strategy to alleviate several forms of inequalities [15]. When it 
comes to the case of Uganda however, the country represents a striking paradox. Significant 
investments and policy reforms in education (such as Universal Primary and Secondary Education) 
since 1997, did not yield the expected results concerning poverty reduction through human capital 
investment [15]. Progress in poverty alleviation is idle in Uganda [15]. Here we can see in the 
network how direct links are seen between education (node 2) and poverty (node 6). The lack of 
education (node 1,2) in turn exacerbates the conflict outbreaks (node 12, 13). This is most likely due 
to the major effects of inadequate education which include: unemployment, exploitation, and gender 
inequality. 
The climate, conflict nexus is therefore a multifaceted one in Uganda that requires focus both on 
socio-economic risks as well as climate risks to try reducing porosities in the system that are 
ultimately driving conflict outbreaks in the region.  
Annex. Methods and data 
We use a regularized partial correlation network [14], as part of Markov random fields, to model the 
climate-socioeconomic-conflict relationships. A network is a graphical representation of the 
relationships (edges) between different entities (nodes). The variables, represented by the nodes, are 
categorized as (a) climate variables, (b) conflict variables, and (c) socioeconomic risk variables which 
are further grouped into (c.1) poverty and inequality risk variables, (c.2) nutritional insecurity variables, 
and (c.3) employment and education variables. The edges between nodes, representing the partial 
correlation coefficients encode the remaining statistical association between two variables after 
controlling for all other information possible (conditional independence associations). These partial 
correlation coefficients were estimated from a matrix of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients for 
continuous variables. Polychoric correlations were used for categorical variables, polyserial and biserial 
correlations used between variables of different types. To eliminate non-significant relationships, the 
partial correlation network was regularized using a Lasso regularization [15] with an EBIC model 
selection [16]. 
Climate variables were compiled using Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data 
(CHIRPS) data [17]. Conflict data were gathered from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
Project (ACLED). Socio-economic data were collated from the Living Standard Measurement Surveys 
(LSMS). 
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